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LOOKING OFF THE BALL:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN POLITICS

Casual spectators follow politics and law the same way they follow sports and
entertainment. During sporting events, the camera and average fan obsessively follow the ball
and scoreboard. Millions tune in each week to discover who gets voted off the island or remains
in the American Idol competition. During political and legislative campaigns, the camera and
average fan obsessively follow opinion polls and keep legislative scorecards. Litigants and
court-watchers count judicial votes and determine the winning percentages of the leading
litigants before the Supreme Court.
Afficionados of sports and politics recognize that the crucial events which determine
outcomes often take place away from the camera’s eye. Players on successful teams create
scoring opportunities by moving without the ball. Producers and directors conduct extensive offcamera investigations that ensure viewers will be entranced by the televised product. Students of
congressional elections are similarly aware that the private campaign for dollars frequently
determines the public campaign for votes.1 Power accrues to those who control the political
agenda, not to those who win particular votes.2 Public law scholars, by comparison, too rarely
1

See Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home in Washington

(CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2004).
2

See William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (Yale University Press: New

Haven, 1986); Peter Bachrach and Morton S, Baratz, Power & Poverty: Theory & Practice
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1970).

2

“look off the ball.” “The scholarly focus,” Keith Whittington observes, remains “on individual
justices and how they cast their votes.”3
Public law scholars who focus entirely on the public conflicts between constitutional
authorities fail to appreciate how constitutional law influences American politics and judicial
decision making. Legal norms better explain how constitutional controversies are structured
than how they are resolved. Basic principles of constitutional law help secure legal agreement in
the face of political disagreement. Political actors who reason constitutionally do not dispute
numerous matters that they dispute vigorously when employing other justificatory logics.
Citizens who disagree about the merits of a recent Supreme Court nomination nevertheless agree
that the nominee will legitimately serve on the bench if confirmed by the Senate. When political
disagreements are resolved into legal disagreements, basic principles of constitutional law alter
the terrain on which those conflicts are fought. Political actors who reason constitutionally
debate different matters than they do when they employ other justificatory logics. Elected
officials and interest groups during the New Deal debated the merits of national legislation
mandating collective bargaining. The justices on the Hughes Court debated whether various
industries covered by the resulting laws were engaged in interstate commerce.
The following pages detail how and why constitutional law influences both judicial and
public decision making. Part I discusses the allure of and problems with the common view that
constitutional argument merely masks policy preferences. Treating justices as free to express
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their partisan commitments may seem to explain Bush v. Gore,4 but not the judicial failure to
intervene in the other numerous presidential elections in which the candidate favored by most
members of the Supreme Court lost. Part II details the agreement function of constitutional law,
how constitutional norms and standards generate legal agreements among persons who dispute
the underlying merits of particular policies under constitutional attack. The norms and standards
explain constitutional criticism, why only a small proportion of the political questions that
occupy Americans are normally resolved into constitutional questions, and how legislatures by
making constitutionally “safe” choices may immunize their decisions from judicial scrutiny.
Part III describes how constitutional law structures those constitutional controversies that do take
place. Constitutional debates are often quite different from other political debates because
constitutional norms and standards require constitutional decision makers treat as important
phenomena of less interest to policy makers and attach little significance to those phenomena
crucial to the underlying policy decision. Part IV briefly comments on aspects of constitutional
decision making obscured by too sharp a distinction between law and policy. Political scientists
who neatly divide the justificatory world into legal norms and policy norms implicitly take sides
in hotly contested interpretive debates and overlook the most important differences between
elected officials and justices as constitutional decision makers.
The commentary below frequently makes points that are obvious. Who would bother
conducting a quantitative study exploring whether pro-capital punishment judges in states and
countries that have abolished the death penalty nevertheless insist that the relevant constitution
mandates that murder be punished by death? If, however, justices exercise “virtually
4
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untrammeled policy-making authority,”5 as much political science folk wisdom repeatedly
insists, no reason exists for ruling out this possibility. Clearly, when political scientists refer to
justices as policymakers, they do not mean that justices are as free as elected officials to mandate
the death penalty. The question is what do they mean. The argument below indicates that
whatever they mean must take constitutional law into account.

I. The Allure of Attitudinalism

Reducing constitutional law to politics by other phrases is tempting and problematic.
Contemporary constitutional disputes, both on and off the bench, are typically between liberals
and conservatives. Quantitative studies consistently find that ideology best explains differences
between judicial votes on constitutional issues. Nevertheless, far more agreement exists on
constitutional norms that would be the case were constitutional argument a form of policy or
partisan argument with a few more Latin words and blue book citations tossed in. Constitutional
decision makers committed primarily to expressing their political preferences would vote
differently and, more important, write opinions much differently than they do in actual practice.
Judicial divisions over contested constitutional issues throughout American history
frequently reflect underlying political commitments. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,6 all five justices
from the slave states voted to prohibit bans on slavery in American territories. The four justices
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from the free states wrote opinions that reflected their progressively greater anti-slavery
sentiment. Justice Robert Grier concurred with the southern justices, Justice Samuel Nelson
decided that Dred Scott remained a slave without deciding on the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise, Justice Benjamin Curtis insisted that Congress could ban slavery in the
territories, and Justice John McLean implied that Congress was constitutionally required to ban
slavery in the territories. The voting pattern in Grutter v. Bollinger7 and Gratz v. Bollinger8,
decided almost 150 years later, exhibited a similar pattern. The three most liberal justices on the
Rehnquist Court voted to sustain the use of race in the admissions process by both the law school
and undergraduate program at the University of Michigan. Justices Stephen Breyer and Sandra
Day O’Connor voted to sustain the law school’s affirmative action program, but not the
affirmative action program for undergraduates, with the more conservative O’Connor calling for
stricter constitutional restrictions on affirmative action than the more liberal Breyer. Justice
Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to strike down both programs without
rejecting affirmative action entirely. The most conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court,
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, voted to strike down both programs and rejected
affirmative action entirely. Judicial voting and opinions in other political charged cases exhibit
the same ideological pattern, whether the issue be capital punishment, abortion, or limits on
congressional power under the commerce clause.9
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Partisan divisions outside the court are no different on constitutional issues. Liberals in
Congress and in the law reviews support abortion rights while claiming that environmental
regulations do not take property unconstitutionally. Conservatives in Congress and in the law
reviews insist that bans on abortion are constitutional, but that many environmental regulations
run afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. “A broad generalization, inaccurate only at
the margins,” Mark Tushnet writes, “is that nearly every constitutional theorist urges minimal
judicial review and vigorous democratic dialogue on issues on which the theorist believes her
preferred position is likely to prevail in the democratic dialogue and more-than-minimal review
on issues on which the theorist believes her preferred position is unlikely to prevail there.”10
Statistical analysis of judicial voting supports this common impression. Studies
consistently find that ideology best explains differences in judicial voting. As the leading
proponents of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior claim, “the Supreme Court decides
disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the
justices.”11 These attitudes and values are not complex. Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth believe
that most divisions among the justices can be mapped on a simple liberal/conservative axis.
“Simply put,” they famously conclude, “[William] Rehnquist vote[d] the way he [did] because
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he [was] extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because he was
extremely liberal.”12
The equally obvious phenomenon of judicial agreement on contested partisan issues
should have cast doubt on this effort to reduce constitutional law to ideology. Consider Bush v.
Gore, presently considered the prime exhibit for the case against treating constitutional law as
having independent significance. The justices in that case are said to have voted in “a blatant
politically partisan fashion,”13 with the more conservative justices voting for Bush and the more
liberal justices voting for Gore. Even ignoring some internal problems with this analysis,14
partisanship alone does not explain Supreme Court decision making in the aftermath of the 2000
presidential election. A high probability exists that a majority of the justices on the Supreme
Court favored the losing candidate in the 1800, 1804, 1828, 1832, 1840, 1848, 1860, 1868, 1884,
1892, 1912, 1916, 1932, 1936, 1992 and 1996 presidential elections.15 Good reason exists for
thinking a strong minority, possibly a bare majority, favored the losing candidate in the 1808,
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1864, 1952, 1956, 1972 and 1976 presidential elections.16 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
refrained from intervening, no matter how opposed the justices were to the putative presidentelect. The “dyed-in-the-wool Federalist(s)”17 who controlled the Supreme Court in 1800 did not
issue an opinion in Adams v. Jefferson which had the practical effect of handing the second
president a second term. Supreme Court justices who hated Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln
and Franklin Roosevelt held their pens when those “enemies of the constitution” were anointed
by the electorate.
These failures to act in “a blatantly politically partisan fashion” cannot be explained by
partisan failures to bring an appropriate case before the Supreme Court. An institution whose
members exercise “virtually untrammeled policy-making authority”18 would not have to
passively wait for their preferred president candidate find constitutional grounds for reversing the
apparently electoral result. Politically active Federalists in 1800 and Republicans in 1936 who
thought justices decided cases solely on the basis of “ideological attitudes and values” and often
acted in “a blatant politically partisan fashion” would certainly have manufactured some
constitutional dispute as a vehicle for having the Ellsworth and Hughes Courts declare John
Adams and Alf Landon, respectively, the winner of that year’s presidential election. History
suggests that such a judicial coup in a reasonably close election would not have done irreparable
16
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harm to either the nation or judiciary. An American public that has tolerated the election of a
president who received fewer popular votes than a rival candidate and demurred when the
justices decided Bush v. Gore probably would not have rioted in the streets had the Republican
majority on the Waite Court found a constitutional excuse for declaring James Blaine the winner
of the 1884 national election.
When Segal and Spaeth claim that Adams v. Jefferson, Blaine v. Cleveland, Landon v.
Roosevelt and other similar lawsuits would be based on “meritless” legal claims that “no selfrespecting judge would decide solely on the basis of his or her policy preferences,”19 they
undermine the entire foundations of their model of judicial behavior. Such legal materials as
precedent, text, and history must matter, otherwise no grounds would exist for distinguishing
meritless from worthy legal claims. If some constitutional arguments have no legal merits, then
justices do not act as “untrammeled” policy makers. Rather, Segal and Spaeth apparently
concede that justices act on notions of good policy only when competent constitutional
arguments support their policy preferences. “Plausible legal arguments” must exist “on both
sides.”20 Unfortunately, at no point do Segal and Spaeth make any effort to compare the
universe of plausible policy preferences to the universe of policy preferences supported by
competent constitutional arguments.21 Absent such an analysis, fifty years of research on
judicial behavior seems to have proven little more than the unsurprising proposition that law
19
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cannot entirely explain the outcome of those cases in which all parties made plausible legal
arguments.
The attitudinal model further overlooks how justices control to some degree what
constitutes a “plausible legal argument.” Judges write legal opinions that both justify a particular
decision and structure future constitutional litigation. By framing issues in particular ways,
judicial opinions make more plausible some future legal claims while placing increased obstacles
in the way of others. Were constitutional law a mask for policy and partisan preferences, one
would expect by now that the justices would have constructed a set of precedents that provide the
legal foundations necessary for guaranteeing that the Supreme Court chose all elected officials
and determined all vital national policies. This is far from the case. Indeed, as will become clear
shortly, constitutional precedents enable the justices to intervene only on a small fraction of the
issues that excite the American public.
Constitutional law does a better job explaining agreement than disagreement.
Conventional claims that constitutional law masks ideological preferences miss this function of
constitutional law when they analyze only differences in judicial voting. Segal and Spaeth
correctly note that when Rehnquist and Marshall voted differently, Marshall almost always took
a more liberal position than Rehnquist. Marshall and Rehnquist did not, however, almost always
vote differently. They voted together more than two-fifths of the time and presumable not
always in cases brought by either really extreme conservatives or liberals. Marshall and
Rehnquist frequently agreed on the constitutional status of hotly contested policy choices. Both
justices voted to sustain President Carter’s policies during the Iran hostage crisis22 and insisted
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that the Supreme Court not scrutinize very strictly conditions on federal spending.23 Neither
justice wrote an opinion suggesting that President Reagan’s tax cuts were unconstitutional or that
Robert Bork had a constitutional right to Senate confirmation. Public law scholarship must
explain these agreements as well as their more public disagreements.
II. Creating Agreement

The strength of practices such as law is best measured by determining the extent to which
practitioners agree on the appropriate norms and application of those norms. Bridge bidding
conventions matter even though experts dispute whether a bidder should say “one no-trump”
when holding five cards in the spade or heart suit, because agreement exists on whether “one notrump” is the correct bid in the Standard American System for approximately 99.9% of all
possible hands. Constitutional criticism, the remarkable limited agenda of constitutional courts,
and the existence of safe harbors on almost every constitutional question all indicate that
constitutional law similarly constrains legal practitioners and decision-makers. Constitutions and
constitutional law consistently secure agreements where agreements would otherwise not exist.
People who reason constitutionally agree on numerous legal standards, even when they dispute
the merits of the contested policy. Some constitutional agreements help forge normative
agreements. Americans may favor the electoral college because they revere a constitution which
mandates the electoral college.
The practice of constitutional criticism in the United States illustrates the agreement
function of constitutional law. Anti-Federalists, abolitionists, populists, progressives, and
23
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contemporary citizens have alleged numerous flaws in the constitutional order. Sanford
Levinson has recently penned a polemic describing the constitution as “both insufficiently
democratic, in a country that professes to believe in democracy, and significantly dysfunctional,
in terms of the quality of the government we received.”24 The subjects of his scorn include equal
state representation in the Senate, the electoral college, a life tenured judiciary, the presidential
veto, the limited grounds for impeachment, and the supermajoritarian requirements for
constitutional amendment.25 Yet, as is the case with previous constitutional critics, Levinson
agrees that these pernicious constitutional provisions are presently the law of the land. He does
not insist, the text of Article I to the contrary, that the Patriot Act is illegal because the Senate
which approved that measure is undemocratically constructed.
The rules Levinson challenges have consequences that would almost certainly guarantee
intense constitutional debate were constitutional debate was little more than a stylized version of
policy or political debate. Presidential campaigns would be quite different had the constitution
mandated that the winner gain a majority of the popular votes rather than a majority of the
electoral college votes. Constitutional structures explain why the Kerry and Bush campaigns in
2004 spent almost half their funds on Florida and Ohio, ignoring such states as New York and
California.26 The practice of electing all members of the national legislature from states or
24
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districts located entirely within states contributed significantly to political polarization during the
1850s and to polarization at present.27 Presidential parties do notoriously poorly during the
second midterm election, but no president has ever received a vote of no confidence after such an
adverse result. The constitutional rule limited impeachments to “high crimes and
misdemeanors” restricts the capacity of partisan majorities in Congress to remove an unpopular
president whose party was decisively rejected during the most recent national election. Federal
spending on matters as different as highways and terror prevention grossly favor low population
western states. Equal state representation in the Senate guarantees that Wyoming will garner
(almost) as much transportation funding as New York.28 Numerous popular constitutional
amendments, ranging from prohibitions on child labor to permissions for school prayer, have
failed to meet the supermajoritarian requirements for ratification.29 Nevertheless, although the
“hard wired” provisions of the constitution create political winners and losers, their meaning is
rarely controversial. Californians and Rhode Islanders agree that each state is to be represented
by two senators and that this arrangement significantly benefits Rhode Island.
These agreements on constitutional law may better explain important preferences or
beliefs about best political practices than those preferences or beliefs explain agreements on
27
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constitutional law. Persons socialized in a particular constitutional order may develop relatively
unthinking commitments to the constitutional procedures of their native polity. Whether persons
favor a parliamentary or presidential regime may largely be a function of whether they live and
have been educated in a parliamentary or presidential regime. Some Americans wax poetic over
constitutional institutions with very clouded historical pasts. The framers adopted the electoral
college largely to provide additional political protections for slavery. Madison and others
observed that selecting the president by popular vote would leave southern states with “no
influence in the election on the score of the Negroes”30 No democracy nation subsequently
constitutionalize a practice even resembling the electoral college for electing the national
executive. Given these dubious origins and the utter lack of imitation, good reason exists for
thinking that continued American support for the electoral college31 is rooted in reverence for the
constitution rather than in claimed virtues of that practice that did not occur to the framers and
have not occurred to constitutionalists in any other regime. Had constitutional law mandated
different rules for electing the national executive, those rules would almost certainly enjoy the
same degree of public acclaim.
Constitutional law generates agreements on the legality of controversial public policies as
well as on the legality of potentially controversial political procedures. Tocqueville grossly
30
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distorted both the plasticity of constitutional law and the influence of courts on public policy
when he asserted, "scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question."32 Two recent studies, the first on contemporary
politics,33 the second on politics in the Jacksonian age,34 detail how the majority of political
questions that arise in the United States remain, in whole or in large part, political questions.
Intense political debates are no more likely to be constitutionalized than issues less salient to
most voters. The political questions that have historically divided the two major political parties
in the United States are rarely resolved into constitutional questions and even more rarely settled
by judicial decree. This would not be case were constitutional law a mere mask for policy
preferences and Supreme Court justices unalloyed policymakers.
Professor Frederick Schauer’s comparison of judicial and political agendas cast doubt on
common impressions “that the Constitution, constitutional law, and the Supreme Court not only
occupy a major role in American policymaking, but also in fact make a great deal of American
policy.”35 He found that the justices tend to resolve only political questions of relatively low
interest to the general public. Schauer’s analysis of newspapers and public opinion surveys
revealed that such “hot button issues for the court” as “race, sexual orientation, and abortion . . .
32
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turn out to generate an unexpectedly low amount of attention.”36 Judicial rulings on the
constitutionality of Bush Administration anti-terrorism policies influence the concerns of the
general public only at the margins. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Schauer observes, is not “much more
than a footnote to the war on terrorism” and has “little to do with Iraq–the topic the public and
their representatives now care most about.”37 The issues off the judicial agenda are far more
important to the general public than the issues on the judicial agenda. Schauer points out that the
justices have not ruled on
fuel prices, the minimum wage, income taxes, the estate tax, Social Security,
inflation, interest rates, avian flu, or the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North
Korea, while taking on issues related to healthcare, employment, and education
that could not seriously be described as in any way connected with current or past
policy debates on these topics.38
This tendency for the Court to operate at the periphery of American politics has been true for the
past half-century. “[T]he Court's noninvolvement, with few exceptions,” Schauer details,
encompassed almost all of World War II, European postwar recovery, the
occupation of Japan, the Berlin Airlift, the Cold War, the Korean War, nuclear
disarmament, Cuba, farm policy and agricultural subsidies, recession, the creation
of the interstate highway system, the establishment of Medicare, the war in
Vietnam, double-digit inflation, severe gas shortages, and military operations in
the Dominican Republic, Panama, Somalia, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Iraq, among
others.39
Justices who have no legal capacity to intervene on these matters are not the

36

Schauer, “The Court’s Agenda,” p.16.

37

Schauer, “The Court’s Agenda,” p. 27.

38

Schauer, “The Court’s Agenda,” p. 31-32.

39

Schauer, “The Court’s Agenda,” p. 44.

17

“untrammeled policy makers” described by too much political science and legal literature.
Comparisons of the judicial and political agendas consistently find that “the people and their
elected representatives can nevertheless be understood as still making the vast bulk of decisions
that are most important to the people themselves.”40 Many of these political questions were not
resolved into judicial questions because they were not first resolved into constitutional questions.
Elected officials on issues as diverse as the annexation of Cuba and the privatization of Social
Security have agreed that government may constitutionally make the controversial political
choice. Disagreement was limited to policy considerations. Supreme Court justices apparently
support this consensus. Although each justice writes approximately thirty to forty opinions a
year, no contemporary justice has sought to lay the precedential foundations for making their
policy views the law of the land on tax cuts or troop strength in Iraq.
Constitutional law matters even when political questions are resolved into constitutional
questions. The constitution, in most cases, establishes legal floors or ceilings on government
policy, but not both.41 The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and unusual punishment.” No
constitutional provision bans “unusually compassionate punishment.” Elected officials may
have constitutional obligations to punish crime adequately, but most commentators who
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champion such duties treat them as not legally enforceable.42 This feature of constitutional law
typically provides elected officials making binary policy choices with a constitutional safe
harbor. While one policy choice is constitutionally controversial, the alternative is not.
Constitutional lawyers debate whether government may outlaw flag-burning, impose capital
punishment, and condemn land for private development. General agreement exists that
government may constitutionally permit flag-burning, refrain from imposing capital punishment,
and outlaw condemnations for private development.
Constitutional safe harbors sharply constrain judicial capacity to influence public policy
and shape constitutional development. Persons deciding exclusively on policy logics are free to
choose whether to outlaw flag burning, impose capital punishment or condemn land for private
development. Persons deciding exclusively on constitutional logics may intervene only when
policy makers select the constitutionally controversial alternative. Justices who believe the death
penalty morally evil and unconstitutional strike down legislative efforts to mandate capital
punishment. Justices who believe the death penalty a moral necessity and constitutionally
permitted have no constitutional grounds for intervention when policy makers refuse to punish
murder by death. The Marshall Court found this limit on constitutional adjudication particularly
frustrating. Shortly after handing down McCulloch v. Maryland,43 the justices wrote a letter to
President Monroe declaring that their opinion upholding the national bank provided the
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necessary legal precedent for sustaining the internal improvements bill under presidential
consideration.44 Nevertheless, when Monroe vetoed that bill on constitutional grounds,45
constitutional law did not provide the Marshall Court with the authority to reverse that
constitutional mistake.46 A constitutional disagreement could not be fully translated into a legal
disagreement because the President Monroe had made the constitutionally uncontroversial,
controversial policy choice.
The Marshall Court was one of many constitutional decision makers whose influence on
public policy was sharply limited by their obligation to justify decisions legally. Decision
makers limited to constitutional logics do not participate in debates over the merits of the
constitution. They do not participate in the numerous policy debates, ranging from the proper
strategy in Iraq to the structure of national education testing, that are not resolved into
constitutional debates. Justices do not participate in constitutional debates whenever elected
officials choose the constitutionally uncontroversial policy. These limits on constitutional
decision making hardly leave constitutional authorities with a dull agenda. Abortion, affirmative
action, environmental regulations, and the status of detainees during the war on terrorism are
examples of the hot political questions that constitutional logics permit to be resolved into
judicial questions. Still, we should not make “the fallacious leap from the accurate premise that
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much of what the Supreme Court does is important to the erroneous conclusion that much of
what is important is done by the Supreme Court.”47 When keeping one eye on the judicial
agenda, students of constitutional politics should keep their other eye firmly on the rest of the
political agenda. As the Bible remains us, understanding that David has slain “his ten
thousands” puts in better perspective claims that “Saul has slain his thousands.”

III. Structuring Disagreement

Law structures constitutional conflicts when constitutional conflicts break out. Persons
who reason from constitutional norms have different disagreements than persons who reason
from other norms. Ideology often explains the differences between persons engaged in a
constitutional debate, but law usually explains the debate they are having. Policy disputes over
whether the president’s economic policies are wise are quite different from constitutional
disputes over whether national economic policies regulate interstate commerce, even if both pit
liberals against conservatives.
Thinking about “jurisprudential regimes” provides a helpful way of understanding how
constitutional law influences constitutional disputes. As detailed by Mark Richards and Herbert
Kritzer, “jurisprudential regimes structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which
case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny or balancing
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the justices are to employ in assessing case factors.”48 The presence of a jurisprudential regime
does not guarantee that all justices will reach the same conclusions. Rather, jurisprudential
regimes encourage justices to ask the same questions. Justices making decisions in the
jurisprudential regime instituted by Plessy v. Ferguson49 focused on the extent to which the
separate facilities offered to white persons and persons of color could be said to be equal. When
constitutional decision makers disagreed, their dispute was over whether the law was a race
distinction or a race discrimination.50 Justices making decisions in the jurisprudential regime
instituted by Brown v. Board of Education51 focused on the extent to which laws made justifiable
race distinctions. When constitutional decision makers disagreed, their dispute was over whether
government had a sufficiently compelling reason to make a conceded race
distinction/discrimination.52
Preliminary studies indicate that the establishment of a jurisprudential regime influences
judicial voting. Richards and Kritzer found that the same justice was likely to be influenced by
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different factors after an important precedent established clear case law. Judicial voting patterns
changed when the Supreme Court in Chicago Police Department v. Mosley53 and Grayned v.
Rockford54 ruled that time, place and manner regulations had to be content neutral. Justices of
all political persuasions were more likely to protect “racial minorities, alleged communists, and
businesses” after Mosley and Grayned were decided.55 While the existence of a content neutral
regulation had no statistical impact on judicial voting before 1972, that factor was statistically
significant afterwards. “[A]fter the adoption of the speech-protective part of the regime that
applies to content-based regulations,” Richards and Kritzer detail, “the justices were likely to be
more supportive of speakers who were regulated based on the content of their speech relative to
speakers whose expression fell within the less protected categories.”56
Lemon v. Kurtzman57 had a similar impact on judicial voting in religion cases. That
decision held that laws passed constitutional muster only if the law had a secular purpose, was
neutral between different religions and avoided excessive government entanglement with
religion. Before that decision, secular purpose and religious neutrality were not statistically
associated with judicial voting, while government monitoring statistically increased the
probability that a justice would vote to sustain the law under constitutional attack. After Lemon
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was handed down, lack of a secular purpose, lack of religious neutrality and government
monitoring statistically increased the probability that a justice would strike down the law under
constitutional attack. Ideology mattered before and after Lemon. Conservative justices were
more likely than liberal justices to reject establishment clause claims. Nevertheless, Lemon
shifted the terrain of judicial debate. Before Lemon, conservative and liberal justices disputed
whether a law was supported by historical practice. After Lemon, conservative and liberal
justices disputed whether the law had a secular purpose, was religiously neutral, and required
excessive government entanglement with religion. Laws that were sustained in one regime were
struck down in the other, even though no significant change in judicial membership had taken
place.58
Jurisprudential regimes include all legal materials that constitutional decision makers
consider when resolving controversies. The language of constitutional provisions structures
constitutional disagreements as do shared understandings about constitutional history.
Understood this broadly, the impact of jurisprudential regimes on constitutional decision making
is obvious. Consider the post-Civil War Amendments. Americans disputed the constitutional
status of persons of color before and after the Civil War. Before the Civil War, whether persons
of color were citizens was a central constitutional issue.59 After the Civil War, disputes were
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over what rights persons of color enjoyed as citizens.60 Before joining the bench in 1859, Nathan
Clifford was on record as supporting the result in Dred Scott.61 While on the bench, Clifford
interpreted narrowly Fourteenth Amendment protections for persons of color,62 but he
nevertheless recognized that the “one pervading purpose” of the post-Civil War constitution was
“the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freedman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”63
Howard Gillman’s acclaimed The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence provides another important case study on how law
influences the terrain of constitutional debate. Gillman demonstrates that two distinctive debates
over business regulation took place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
political debate was over the merits of laissez-faire, over whether government intervention
promoted liberty and efficiency. The legal debate was over the application of the constitutional
animus to class legislation. Participants in these distinctive controversies employed distinctive
justificatory logics. Constitutional decision makers consistently employed legal logics and those
legal logics explain why justices consistently made legal distinctions between cases when there
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was no corresponding policy distinction. As Gillman concludes:
that the justices were by and large motivated by a principled commitment to the
application of a constitutional ideology of state neutrality, as manifested in the
requirement that legislation advance a discernible public purpose . . . explains a
good deal more of the dependent variable (judicial behavior) than do hypothesis
that suggest the justices were basing decisions on a blind adherence to laissezfaire or on a desire to see members of their class win specific lawsuits or on an
interest in imposing their ideiosyncratic policy preferences on the country.64
Policy commitments influenced how different justices applied the constitutional commitment to
state neutrality. Justices who were more sympathetic to state regulation in general were more
likely to find a discernible public purpose than those who were not.65 For this reason, analyses
limited to explaining differences between justices would find ideology the most significant
variable. Such analyses ignore how judicial battles over class legislation were structured
differently than political struggles over the administrative state. The justices sustained hundreds
of laws that political conservatives insisted were economically unwise.66 No policymaker in the
legislature or the White House came close to mirroring any judicial preference. Persons who
based decisions on the “constitutional ideology of state neutrality” behaved differently than those
who based decisions on the night watchman state.
Several lesser known decisions handed down during the “Constitutional Revolution of
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1937" provide another window into the way in which constitutional struggles are often fought
over different terrains than other policy struggles. On the same day the Supreme Court by 5-4
votes ruled that the Wagner Act could be constitutionally applied to business manufacturing steel
and clothing,67 the justices unanimously held that Congress could regulate the hours and wages
of persons employed by a bus company that operated a line that ran between Maryland, the
District of Columbia and Virginia.68 Two weeks earlier, conservatives and liberals on the
Hughes Court unanimously held that Congress could regulate labor relationships in the railroad
business.69 No one in the non-legal world suggested employees who worked on trains and buses
should be treated differently than persons employed by steel and clothing magnates. The
relevant policy debates were over the merits of minimum wages and collective bargaining.
Conservative justices making decision on the basis of constitutional law, by comparison, could
consider only whether the affected business was engaged in interstate commerce. The
constitutional distinction between steel workers and bus drivers reflected a conservative
constitutional commitment to the distinction between production and commerce that had no
conservative policy analogue.
Constitutional law constrained the liberals on the New Deal Court as well as
conservatives, even making the historically false assumption that Justices Stone, Cardozo, and
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Brandeis were enthusiastic proponents of the second New Deal. Unions generally won
legislative struggles during the 1930s, but Congress after World War II increasingly favored
management. Liberals particularly abhorred the Taft-Hartley Act, which placed sharp limits on
strikes. Nevertheless, although President Harry Truman’s veto message described Taft-Hartley
as “a dangerous stride in the direction of a totally managed economy,”70 he and his political
allies regarded the bill as within the enumerated powers of Congress. Having committed
themselves to a substantial effects test which permitted the national government to regulate labor
relations, New Deal constitutionalists lacked the tools to distinguish between pro-union and antiunion legislation. When the Supreme Court debated the constitutionality of Taft-Hartley, their
focus was entirely on the Communist registration provisions,71 a matter that did not occupy much
legislative attention.
Much political science scholarship on American constitutional development explicitly or
implicitly highlights sharp differences between political and constitutional controversies.
Prominent examples include Pamela Brandwein’s analysis of how inherited understandings
about the nature of rights influenced the origins of the state action doctrine,72 Julie Novkov’s
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history of how categories taken from gender influenced New Deal constitutional law,73 and Ken
Kersch’s work on the evolution of privacy law.74 None of these scholars insist that justices shed
their policy preferences once they joined the bench. The argument is simply that these
preferences had to be expressed in legal language and were subtly altered by the “requirement of
translation.”75 Sometimes justices found that commitments made in one area of the law
constrained other constitutional decisions. New Deal protections for speech were truncated in
large part because of previous commitments progressives had made when opposing the freedom
of contract.76 Some justices concluding pressing policy commitments could not be translated
into legally enforceable norms. Elizabeth Bussiere details the difficulty Great Society liberals
had finding welfare rights in the constitution.77 Judicial liberals were more inclined to support
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welfare rights than judicial conservatives, but they provided far less support for welfare rights
than liberals with the same policy commitments in the legislative and executive branches of the
national government.

IV. Beyond the Law/Politics Distinction

Too sharp distinctions between policy and legal obscure how constitutional decision
making may incorporate both in ways that cannot be fully separated. Prominent constitutional
thinkers maintain that constitutional decision makers are sometimes obligated to engage in value
voting. Ronald Dworkin, Sotirios Barber, James Fleming and others maintain that justices and
others have an obligation “to interpret the Constitution to make it the best it can be.”78 Justices
who refuse to make value judgments, they believe, act illegality, violating their obligation to be
faithful to the law.79 Remarkably, Justice Antonin Scalia agrees, approving how "the inevitable
tendency of justices to think the law is what they would like it to be . . . cause(s) most errors in
judicial historiography to be made in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current,
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modern values."80 This brief excursion into constitutional theory suggests the crucial issue is
when constitutional decision makers are legally entitled to engage in value voting, and not
whether value voting is legitimate legally. Investigation is likely to reveal broad agreements that
value voting is permissible in some circumstances, impermissible in other instances, and
controversial on those matters on which constitutional decision makers disagree.81
Distinctions between law and policy do not capture distinctions between how elected
officials and justices make decisions. Constitutional decision making takes place in all
governing institutions. “Immortal principles fly their standards in judicial opinions,” Thomas
Reed Powell observed in 1918, “(b)ut so they do in the common every-day talk of the butcher
and the banker, of the suffragists and the anti-suffragist, the pacifist and the militarist, the
Socialist and the individualist.”82 Much recent political science literature details how Presidents
and members of Congress, in particular, have made principled constitutional arguments when
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engaged in heated constitutional debates.83 Nevertheless, elected officials making constitutional
decisions may have different constitutional commitments than justices.
Professor Tom Keck’s research demonstrates how institutional affiliations influence
constitutional decision making. His essay in the 2007 American Political Science Review
compared the judicial coalitions responsible for declaring fifty-three federal laws
unconstitutional between 1980 and 2004 with the legislative and executive coalitions
responsible for passing those measures. Judicial voting patterns proved distinctive. Justices
neither voted as liberals or conservatives did in the national legislature, nor as Republicans or
Democrats. On a tribunal that
“never included more than two Democratic appointees,” Keck observes.
more than 70% of its judicial review decisions were issued by bipartisan
coalitions and more than 80% invalidated statutes that had been enacted with
substantial Republican legislative support. Similarly, more than sixty percent of
the decisions are inconsistent with a model of policy-motivated judging, either
because they were joined by both liberal and conservative justices or because they
reached results that are difficult to place in ideological space.84
Scholars aware of these findings would attend more carefully “to the possibility of institutionally
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motivated action,” in particular, the influence of law on judicial decisions.85 Keck concludes,
“(s)o long as the justices think the purpose of an independent judiciary is to defend certain
fundamental principles against majoritarian interference, that normative commitment is likely to
shape at least some of their decisions.”86
One should not confuse “institutional motivations” with a commitment “to defend settled
law against majoritarian override,” as Keck sometimes does.87 The elected officials who voted
for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and for the Americans with Disabilities Act thought
they were protecting fundamental constitutional principles from (local) majoritarian interference.
Many prominent constitutional scholars side with Congress, insisting that the Supreme Court
decisions declaring those measures unconstitutional were inconsistent with both the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and settled precedents.88 Institutional affiliation may
matter, such cases as City of Boerne v. Flores89 and Board of Trustees of University of Alabama
v. Garrett90 indicate, because justices have different beliefs about constitutional authority and
constitutional interpretation than elected officials, and not because the former are more prone to
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be motivated by law. Keck’s evidence suggests that justices are more likely than elected
officials to be committed to libertarian understandings of constitutional rights, formalist
interpretations of the separation of powers, and judicial supremacy.91 These findings cast
important light on the consequences of giving justices the power to declare laws unconstitutional,
even if they do not reflect the traditional law/politics distinction.

V. Toward a Better Research Agenda

Judge, later Justice, Benjamin Cardozo’s famous Storrs lectures still provide the best
starting place for scholars interested in understanding the influence of law on judging and
constitutional decision making. When considering how to “decide a case,” Cardozo first noted
that “[t]here are times when the [decision] is obvious” because either the text or precedent
plainly resolved a legal dispute.92 These pure legal logics were insufficient when there were
“gaps in the law.” In such instances, “justice and general utility” were “the two objectives”
Cardozo though should influence judicial votes.93 Significantly, Cardozo added, on most matters
the law was fairly clear. Quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, he insisted,
I recognize without hesitation that judges must and do legislate, but they do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A
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common-law judge could not say, I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of
historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court.94
Cardozo’s observations highlight how law often settles matters before substantial controversies
arise. Controversies take place only in legal gaps and the nature of these gaps are largely
determined by legal texts, legal precedents, and legal history. Behavioral analysis that focuses
entirely on disagreements among legal authorities over the precise application of “the doctrine of
consideration” cannot appreciate the central role consideration plays in contract law. A similar
obsession with explaining controversies over the meaning of the First Amendment overlooks all
the controversies Americans do not have because of the First Amendment.
Much good empirical work will be done once public law scholars acknowledge the
relative autonomy of constitutional law. We need more extensive research on the nature of
constitutional reasoning. On some accounts, constitutional decision makers make self-conscious
decisions to follow the constitution rather than their policy preferences.95 Other accounts suggest
constitutionalism is constitutive, that persons occupying certain roles are simply socialized to
think constitutionally.96 Whether a constitution is “a machine that would go of itself”97 may
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depend partly on which account of constitutional reasoning is correct. We need more extensive
research on how constitutional questions arise and are settled. Americans in the nineteenth
century thought protective tariffs raised constitutional questions. Free trade, at present, is
considered entirely a policy choice. No existing approach to constitutional decision making
explains this transformation. Most important, we need more extensive research into the different
ways in which persons in different institutional settings make constitutional decisions. A good
deal of contemporary scholarship indicates that judicial review is unnecessary as a means for
ensuring decisions are made on the basis of constitutional principle.98 All governing coalitions
act on the basis of constitutional visions that structure their policy choices. Nevertheless, much
contemporary scholarship also suggests that justices act on different constitutional principles
than other governing officials.99 What those principles are and whether their articulation is
desirable should be central to the next generation of constitutional law scholarship.
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